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Voices from the Stars? America's
Generals and Public Debates
Maj. Gen. CharlesJ. Dunlap, Jr., USAF
Military officers rarely relish the prospectoftestit)ring before Congress, particularly ifit means disagreeing with the Commander-in-Chief. As I can
personally attest, it is absolutely excruciating when
headlines like "Military Lawyers Fault Bush Plan for
Terror Suspects" follow your testimony. Loyalty to
one's commander is a bedrock value ofthe profession ofarms, and seeming to deviate from it is
counterintuitive to every officer's makeup. Respectful disagreement with policy drafts is not, one
hopes anyway, viewed as disloyalty.
The protocol ofCongressionaltestimony is, I
learned, for Administration officials to clear an
officer's opening statement. However, once
questioning begins, the process permits personal
opinions identified as such. That is what happened
when senior military lawyers Gudge advocates"JAGs") testified before the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) hearings in early September on
the complicated issue ofthe legal architecture for
militmycommissions.
As only a democracy like America's can tolerate,
the concerns ofthe JAGs received a very public
airing. Opponents ofthe Administration's plan
understandably seized upon the critical portions of
the testimony as demonstrating the proposal's
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Others may determine there is no real inconsistency,
but the question remains: what is the proper public
role ofactive duty officers? Most active duty
generals fully appreciate the dangers ofan overlyassertive military caste. The deeply-ingrained
American tradition ofan apolitical military subservientto civilian control properly instills reticence,
especially in the senior ranks.

flaws. Shortly thereafter, however, those same
opponents were perplexed when the judge advocates who had testified vigorously against key parts
ofthe draft nevertheless signed a letter saying they
did not object to two other portions ofthe proposal
(purporting to clarifY the meaning ofCommon
Article 3 ofthe Geneva Conventions).
Why the consternation? Unbeknownst to the
military attorneys, the "do not object" language was
touted by some advocates ofthe Administration's
proposal as indicating support for harsh CIA
interrogation techniques. Ofcourse, this JAG (and
likely the others) had not only never subscribed to
that view, he had never been asked to opine upon
it. The letter was signed wholly in the context ofa
JAG's knowledge and expertise, that is, the armed
forces, not the activities ofintelligence agencies to
which he is not privy.

Generals also know the risks ofdisagreeing with the
civilian leadership. Accepted wisdom holds that
officers should invariably reflect the views ofthe
Executive Branch. Stray from the officialline? The
treatment ofArmy General Eric Shinseki after
testifYing honestly (and, as it turns out, accurately)
about troop requirements for Iraq's occupation is
widely viewed as an object lesson ofthe most
negative type.
Some believe generals can speak their minds so
long as they limitthemselvesto purely military
matters. The problem? There is really no such
thing as "purely" military matters. Clausewitz
famously observed that war is "a continuation of
political intercourse ... by other means." With war's
enormous demand on blood, treasure, and national
honor, military matters intertwine every dimension
ofanation's life, including politics.

Such is the nature ofWashington politics. In an
article aptly headlined "Military Lawyers Caught in
Middle on Tribunals" the New York Times observed thatthe experience "demonstrated the perils
ofactive-duty officers' speaking openly about
sensitive subjects." Regardless, the two main
opponents in this controversy eventually achieved a
compromise that included rectifYing the key problems the JAGs had identified in their RASC testimony, as well as in earlier Congressional hearings.

Instinctive loyalty to -and respect for -the chain of
commanddisinclinesmilitaryprofessionals from
airing their personal views. This is as it should be,
unless and until that loyalty and respect becomes
interpreted publicly as ideological agreementthat
contradicts their true professional judgment. The
Supreme Court rightly advocates insulating the
armed forces from "the reality or appearance of
acting as a handmaiden for partisan political
causes."

JAGs arenotthe only senior officers who find
avoiding political minefields difficult, especially in an
election year. Consider the situation ofGeneraI
George Casey, America's top commander in Iraq.
At a Pentagon news conference lastJune, he
insisted that setting a timetable for withdrawal
would "limit his flexibility" and "send aterrible
signal" to Iraq's new government ofnational unity.
This presumably strictly military opinion also
happened to dovetail perfectly with the view ofone
sideofahighly-politicizeddebate. Yet hardly a day
later media reports claimed that a drawdown was,
in fact, under consideration by the general, much to
the delight ofthe other side ofthe argument.

A fundamental misunderstanding ofthe real meaning
ofcivilian control also confuses the issue. Of
course, it requires prompt, respectful, and comp lete
obedience to lawful orders. But it does not mandate open support -or even silent acquiescenceContinued on page 10
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Schraggercaptures an example ofthis unique
perspective thatJAGs acquire:

America's Generals...
Continued from page 9

Military lawyers seem to conceive
oftheruleoflawdifferently[than
civilian counterparts]. Instead of
seeing law as a barrier to the
exercise oftheir clients , power,
these attorneys understand the law
as a prerequi site to the meaningful
exercise ofpower. Law allows our
troops to engage in forceful, violent
acts with relatively little hesitation or
moral qualms. Law makes just wars
possible by creating a well-defined
legal space within which individual
soldiers can act without resorting to
their own personal moral codes.

to the partisan views ofthe military's civilian masters.
Actually, unlike the militaries ofsome nations,
American military officers do not take an oath of
fealty to any particular individual or political party,
but rather to the Constitution itself. The Constitution, in turn, tasks all the three branches ofgovernmentwith civilian-<:<>ntrol responsibilities.
The Executive and Legislative branches usually
predominate because they are subject to the
electorate as the courts are not. For this process to
work properly, however, elected officials and,
ultimately, the people themselves, need the fullest
possible exposition ofthe issues. In America' s
democracy, the FirstAmendment facilitates the kind
ofpublic discourse that produces the world's most
powerful military.
Logically, the expert views ofsenior military leaders, including its JA Gs, would seem to enhance a
discussion ofany other national security matter.
Formany reasons, career military officer-lawyers
have views distinct from their civilian counterparts.
Because they are military officers, JAGs strive to be
independent and nonpartisan in ways a civilian
lawyer who is a political appointee need not be nor,
especially, oughtto be.
And there is more. Long-term service in uniform
gives JAGs a depth ofunderstanding ofarmed
forces - the "separate society" in Supreme Court
parlance-to a degree impossible to acquire
otherwise. As fellow military members subjectto
the same altruistic "unlimited liability contract" that
everyone in uniform undertakes, they have a special
bond with those with whom they serve that simply
cannot be replicated.
All ofthis creates a different mindset in JAGs. In an
especially insightful recent article in Slate (http://
www.slate.com/idl2150050/)Professor Richard

In any event, a nation dependent upon an enormous
all-volunteer force oughtto knowwhattheirmilitary
leaders are thinking. Indeed, opening their generals' opinions to public scrutiny might serve a
democracy's long-term interests. Nevertheless,
should concepts ofduty and decorum exclude
generals from public dialogue? Absolutely, ifthe
subject is, for example, the suitability ofcivilian
leadership. Likewise, security and operational
concerns can appropriately close mouths.
The danger ofunsettling the troops also obliges
caution. Lt. Gen. John Vines, then a senior commander in Iraq, reportedly characterized the mere
existence oflastwinter' s Congressional debate
about Iraq as "disturbing." This is indeed sobering
commentary because everyone understandably
fears undermining the morale ofsoldiers far from
home.
Yet real support ofthe troops might demand a
frank, national debate, however painful. Still,
should America' s generals participate? Ifso, how?
Occasional congressional hearings seem to be an
appropriate forum, but are such hearings the only
proper outlet? Uncertain oftheir authority to speak
openly, some generals may talk privately to the
press, members of Congress, or to another proxyincluding officers in the retired ranks.
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But is this the way Americans oughtto divine the
views oftheir still-serving generals? Plainly, few
fully accepted paths exist. The electorate and their
political leaders need to decide when and how they
wantto hear from their generals, ifatall. Once they
decide, it is then forthe generals to salute smartly
and obey.
Charles Dunlap is Deputy Judge Advocate
General of the Air Force. These are his personal views and not necessarily those of the
Department of Defense.
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